A Dynamic Boundary Guarding Problem with Translating Targets

We introduce a problem in which a service vehicle seeks to guard a deadline (boundary) from dynamically arriving mobile targets. The environment is a rectangle and the deadline is one of its edges. Targets arrive continuously over time on the edge opposite the deadline, and move towards the deadline at a fixed speed. The goal for the vehicle is to maximize the fraction of targets that are captured before reaching the deadline. We consider two cases; when the service vehicle is faster than the targets, and; when the service vehicle is slower than the targets. In the first case we develop a novel vehicle policy based on computing longest paths in a directed acyclic graph. We give a lower bound on the capture fraction of the policy and show that the policy is optimal when the distance between the target arrival edge and deadline becomes very large. We present numerical results which suggest near optimal performance away from this limiting regime. In the second case, when the targets are slower than the vehicle, we propose a policy based on servicing fractions of the translational minimum Hamiltonian path. In the limit of low target speed and high arrival rate, the capture fraction of this policy is within a small constant factor of the optimal.Comment: Extended version of paper for the joint 48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and 28th Chinese Control Conferenc

FlipDyn with Control: Resource Takeover Games with Dynamics

We present the FlipDyn, a dynamic game in which two opponents (a defender and an adversary) choose strategies to optimally takeover a resource that involves a dynamical system. At any time instant, each player can take over the resource and thereby control the dynamical system after incurring a state-dependent and a control-dependent costs. The resulting model becomes a hybrid dynamical system where the discrete state (FlipDyn state) determines which player is in control of the resource. Our objective is to compute the Nash equilibria of this dynamic zero-sum game. Our contributions are four-fold. First, for any non-negative costs, we present analytical expressions for the saddle-point value of the FlipDyn game, along with the corresponding Nash equilibrium (NE) takeover strategies. Second, for continuous state, linear dynamical systems with quadratic costs, we establish sufficient conditions under which the game admits a NE in the space of linear state-feedback policies. Third, for scalar dynamical systems with quadratic costs, we derive the NE takeover strategies and saddle-point values independent of the continuous state of the dynamical system. Fourth and finally, for higher dimensional linear dynamical systems with quadratic costs, we derive approximate NE takeover strategies and control policies which enable the computation of bounds on the value functions of the game in each takeover state. We illustrate our findings through a numerical study involving the control of a linear dynamical system in the presence of an adversary.Comment: 17 Pages, 2 figures. Under review at IEEE TA

A Concentration-Based Approach for Optimizing the Estimation Performance in Stochastic Sensor Selection

In this work, we consider a sensor selection drawn at random by a sampling with replacement policy for a linear time-invariant dynamical system subject to process and measurement noise. We employ the Kalman filter to estimate the state of the system. However, the statistical properties of the filter are not deterministic due to the stochastic selection of sensors. As a consequence, we derive concentration inequalities to bound the estimation error covariance of the Kalman filter in the semi-definite sense. Concentration inequalities provide a framework for deriving semi-definite bounds that hold in a probabilistic sense. Our main contributions are three-fold. First, we develop algorithmic tools to aid in the implementation of a matrix concentration inequality. Second, we derive concentration-based bounds for three types of stochastic selections. Third, we propose a polynomial-time procedure for finding a sampling distribution that indirectly minimizes the maximum eigenvalue of the estimation error covariance. Our proposed sampling policy is also shown to empirically outperform three other sampling policies: uniform, deterministic greedy, and randomized greedy

Incentivizing Collaboration in Heterogeneous Teams via Common-Pool Resource Games

We consider a team of heterogeneous agents that is collectively responsible for servicing, and subsequently reviewing, a stream of homogeneous tasks. Each agent has an associated mean service time and a mean review time for servicing and reviewing the tasks, respectively. Agents receive a reward based on their service and review admission rates. The team objective is to collaboratively maximize the number of "serviced and reviewed" tasks. We formulate a Common-Pool Resource (CPR) game and design utility functions to incentivize collaboration among heterogeneous agents in a decentralized manner. We show the existence of a unique Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE), and establish convergence of best response dynamics to this unique PNE. Finally, we establish an analytic upper bound on three measures of inefficiency of the PNE, namely the price of anarchy, the ratio of the total review admission rate, and the ratio of latency, along with an empirical study